Serving as a uniformed police officer is an extraordinarily
difficult task. Because the officer is
charged with responding to circumstances ranging from unhappy to nasty to high
risk and often in highly visible situations, it is likely that no matter how
well s/he handles matters, someone will take exception. Criticism rides the cop’s
beat.
Similarly, pursuing the American dream for a young black or
brown male citizen far too frequently turns out to be an exceptional
challenge. Distrust and apprehension if
not downright fear — sometimes
explicit, other times unconscious — respecting his character, intellect
and, most of all, his motives, dog his steps. He knows first hand what it is to
be “separate and apart”.
Consequently, it is no surprise that when the policeman’s
task happens to encounter the young man’s challenge, the result could well be
an uneasy exchange of perspectives that reinforce already hardened attitudes on
both sides. It is a crushing drama that
happens countless times. And if one of
those clashes between task and challenge becomes newsworthy by pulsating through
traditional and social media or even via simple word of mouth, it becomes a
lightning bolt that triggers a colossal inferno that can swiftly burn up any
prospects for peace and goodwill for years afterward. Consequently, how that lightening bolt is
communicated to various audiences the instant it strikes is crucial to framing how
that confrontation is initially perceived and then internalized in local,
national and even international forums.
Bottom line: any chance for ensuring an immediate beneficial and later,
productive end result from the initial confrontation depends on making use of a
sound crises communications strategy.
CRISIS PREP
In the matter at hand, the applicable portion of the
Ferguson police department’s (FPD) brief mission statement is to
provide for the “protection of life and property…through
the enforcement of laws and ordinances….” The aim of crises communications is to foster
that objective through establishing trust for and credibility in local law
enforcement’s integrity and wherewithal when it
must tackle a controversial police encounter in the local community. Whatever observers’ sentiments
are over what’s been labeled the “Ferguson
Fiasco”, there is near universal agreement
that the FPD crisis communications response was not only ineffective, it made
things worse. For both local African
American residents and the police.
Most of us assume that a credible crisis communications
plan arises at the time of crisis. Hardly.
Developing a successful strategy has to begin much earlier. What’s more, it can’t
be an “If-we-can-find-the-time-for-it” luxury; in this era of a 24/7 news cycle
and social media, it is a vital public safety component. Analogous to making good on an insurance
policy, it has to respond right away to the lightening strike to prevent a
conflagration. Further, when it comes to
local law enforcement, there’s another issue at play: the strong
possibility of a personnel backlash. As
we’ve already observed, even when
engaged in such mundane assignments as writing parking tickets, cops are
subject to raised eyebrows, if not outright disagreement, with those they
ostensibly serve. Understandably, police
officers are inclined to close ranks when one or more of them is publicly
disparaged in the line of duty if only to assert the legitimacy of their
professional conduct. After all, the
vast majority of civilians, lacking police training, have only a rough grasp of
the daily risks involved. Consequently,
whether deserved or not, when public condemnation comes the force’s
way, the impulse to either engage in a code of silence or to react defensively
can become as much a part of a cop’s uniform as her badge. And while resorting to either tactic may
appear successful, long term, both guarantee less cooperation from an
increasingly suspicious and brittle constituency.
In addition to the just-mentioned workforce provocations,
devising a viable crisis communications plan entails addressing several other
pivotal concerns. Among them: harmonizing the strategy with current
departmental policies & practices, identifying the potential audience(s),
selecting key law enforcement representatives to handle the various
communications channels (e.g., face-to-face constituent appearances, social and
traditional media), and forging local and regional cooperative efforts with
other nearby public safety units as well as state, town and county
officials. Nonetheless, generating the
skills to swiftly, accurately and consistently frame the narrative must be at
the top of the list.
WEATHERING THE STORM
Let’s get real: although some folks may
have a gift for it, crisis communications is hard. Really, really hard. It seldom, it ever, feels good and its
positive accomplishments are not always readily apparent. Something bad happened. Everyone knows it. Several residents are now
terrified. Others, outraged. More than a few are both. Everyone expects all the
answers “yesterday” and justice
tomorrow. To boot,, competing eyewitness accounts, unanticipated evidence, traditional media coverage (always with an
eye to ratings), rumors and innuendos blown up by social media, political
gamesmanship and internal controls (e.g,, constraining conflicting social media
stories and biases from fellow officers) guarantee chaos that will stretch to
the horizon. Following is a partial list
of time tested crisis communication tactics to help weather the storm:
•
Set the Foundation. Frame the narrative by telling as much as
possible (including name and rank) even though a full chronology of the
incident may be unavailable at the time.
Share the process (along with an estimated timetable) for completing the
investigation. Explain how and why the ongoing investigative processes are
integral in meeting the department’s mission of service. Contrary to FPD Chief Jackson’s
communications blunders, emphasize that police are proactively seeking the
cooperation of local residents to assist in filling in the missing pieces with
all deliberate speed.
•
Be First.
Chief Jackson lacked the presence of mind to recognize when lightning first
struck his command and, as a consequence, squandered the first crack at
directing the narrative. Losing the
power to make the first impression is losing gold: by relinquishing the initial
hold of his community’s perceptions, he threw away the
chance to positively influence the subsequent feelings and views of his
audience(s) regarding the narrative.
•
Stay Accessible. Make every effort to stand at the podium at
the same hour on a daily basis to update (even if only to speak to how the
investigatory process is faring) and for listening to community leaders and
media inquiries and concerns. Should there be “breaking
news” (e.g.,
significant new findings) a press conference should be held as soon as
practicable.
•
Be Transparent. Crisis communications has no strategic value
as a shield for obfuscating and/or concealing crucial developments,
particularly those that are already widely known or suspected. And to state the obvious, no matter how
smoothly done, it is not a suitable vehicle for advancing falsehoods.
•
Be Consistent.
Chief Jackson furnished long overdue information (i.e., Officer Wilson’s
name) six days after the shooting. By
awkwardly releasing a here-to-fore unknown (to local residents and the media)
video of Michael Brown’s unlawful behavior at the same time,
the pubic presumed a connection to Officer Wilson’s
subsequent action. Yet, after
questioning, the chief denied its relevance to Brown’s
death. In response, black residents
either charged that the video was unfairly prejudicial or photoshopped thereby
only adding to the confusion surrounding the incident.
•
Listen. Dialogue. Crisis communications is a two way street; it’s
as much about listening as informing.
The refusal to answer questions, i.e.,
“no comment”, does nothing to promote trust and
cooperation. Chief Jackson’s too long silence respecting pertinent information
was a crucial factor in leading to a violent vote of no confidence thereby
placing additional risks on FDP and contributing area officers in addition to
local businesses.
• Defend but don’t
be Defensive. As mentioned above, explaining how and why
the appropriate police training and investigation policies and practices have a
direct bearing in determining the eventual verdict provides a constructive
opening for enlightening the aggrieved and the media. However, Chief Jackson’s use of defensive
tactics by selectively presenting already (FPD known) available findings in
drips and drabs in apparent support of Officer Wilson’s character, casts a
suspicious shadow on the chief, Wilson and FPD practices. Even more damaging,
such a gambit strongly suggests that the FPD places greater concern on
protecting one of its own than in fulfilling its mission to the community.
A fundamental ground rule
of crisis communications is that the
victims are where the story is. The media, traditional and social, love to
come to the rescue of the little guy.
Not only does it make for a more compelling story, it encourages more
audiences to identify with the issue. In
fact, many journalists and commentators — red and blue alike — came to the
profession to show the shortcomings of the “power elite” and to serve as John
Doe’s voice. Instead of taking that
motive into account, Chief Jackson justified his aiming of heavy artillery at
demonstrators by verbalizing the “what ifs” (of then potential mob behavior)
thereby contributing to the likelihood of his hypotheticals being realized.
Sadly, his storm preparations only served to further amplify the FPD as a bully
whipping up further indignation and distrust. And a dramatic increase in
television news ratings.
FiIRST (DAY) AND LAST (CHANCE)
Even before Michael Brown’s abrupt death, the FPD’s relationship to Ferguson’s black residents could hardly be
characterized as one of goodwill and ongoing collaboration. For that reason alone, many elected
officials, police officers and local residents in addition to a number of
observers believe that, in Ferguson’s case, implementing a crisis commutations plan would have
been a waste of valuable police time and effort; this firestorm was inevitable. I share that belief but only beginning with
the “second
day”.
A crisis communications plan cannot
resolve long standing community racial tensions. It is not useful for absolving
a cop for allegedly using tactics that only serve to further exacerbate
animosity by confirming prejudices on all sides. It will not act as a salve to those intent on
becoming violent with the police, their fellow citizens while wreaking havoc on
their property. That said, crisis
communications will promote cooperation if it is immediately brought
into play; its success depends upon being used starting on day one. It will be effective for obtaining the
immediate cooperation of involved citizens first by setting the foundation to
promote transparency and information sharing and then exchanging legitimate
concerns and possible solutions by assuaging community anger by acknowledging
the mutual obligation to find common ground.
It will create dialogue. And dialogue will open the door to trust albeit
not with sudden gusts of massive goodwill.
Nonetheless, trust can lay the groundwork for altering “the-police-task-minority-challenge”
dynamic.
Ferguson is a case study of what
happens if the crisis communications response is kept on ice until the next
day, then the next and then the next. If
its tools are neglected, new resentments and old bias will again strike on the
street. Tragically, in the interim, one or both sides will cry that justice in
Ferguson was not done no matter what the final verdict.
John
Banks-Brooks
ZG
Worldwide Associate
(Banks-Brooks
was a cofounder of the Legal & Public Affairs practice of Weber Shandwick
Worldwide (PR) Seattle Office)
